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NOTE
CHARITIES-THE LIABILITY OF A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION FOR
NEGLIGENCE AS AFFECTED BY THE TRUST FUND )OCTRINE AND IN-
DEMNIFYING INSURANCE.-A recent Colorado caseI frequently com-
mented upon has focused attention upon the effect of a charity's being
insured upon its tort liability. Plaintiff was injured due to alleged neg-
ligence in the care and medical treatment of herself while in the de-
fendant's sanitarium as a paying patient. The plaintiff in her replication
admitted that the defendant was a non-profit, charitable organization.
However, the plaintiff contended that the defendant had taken out in-
surance indemnifying the plaintiff against all liability for torts of its
agents in the conduct of the hospital business. Thus, due to the said
policy, a judgment for the plaintiff to be paid by the insurance com-
pany would in no way affect the well established Trust Fund Doctrine.
The court rendered a decision for the plaintiff contending that the
Trust Fund Doctrine would not be disturbed by its decision.
For many years now this country, through the medium of the courts,
has rather generally held that a charitable institution is not liable for
torts committed by its agents or servants. One of the principal bases
for the immunity of the eleemosynary institutions is the so-called Trust
Fund Doctrine. It is the purpose of this writing to analyze the Trust
Fund Doctrine with its limitations and present trends.
To adequately understand the problem before us, it may be well
to try to comprehend just what judicial bodies mean when they speak
of the Trust Fund Doctrine. In the main, one may understand the
theory of the Trust Fund to be that in cases of charitable institutions
1 O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Association, 06 P. 2d 835 (Colo.,
1940).
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trust funds or funds belonging to the institution which are held in
trust for use in furthering the benefits of the organization should not
be diverted therefrom to pay damages arising from torts of servants.
2
This is the reason for the adoption, by the courts, of the Trust Fund
Doctrine in this country.
The first court to exempt an eleemosynary institution from tort lia-
bility because such liability would interfere with the institution's Trust
Fund was the English court in the case of Heriot Hospital v. Ross.:-
From its inception in England, the theory of the Trust Fund Doctrine
found its way to the United States courts in the leading Illinois case of
Parks v. Northwestern University.4 In this case the appellee university
undertook for hire to teach the appellant the science of dentistry, dental
surgery, etc. The appellant alleges that while in the process of the said
teachings the appellee through the negligence of one of its professors
caused the appellant to lose his eye while the student appellant was in
the laboratory under the supervision of the professor. The appellee de-
murred to the complaint on the ground that the appellee University
was a charitable institution organized for the purpose of disseminating
education and professional learning, and that the doctrine that the em-
ployer shall be liable to respond for the negligent acts of its employee
did not apply. The court sustained the demurrer.
In the court's opinion, one comes to understand the basis for the
Trust Fund Doctrine. The court said:
"The appellee University is a private corporation, but it is organ-
ized for purely charitable purposes .... The funds and property thus
acquired are held in trust, and cannot be diverted to the purpose of pay-
ing damages for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful acts of its
servants and employees to persons who are enjoying the benefits of the
charity. An institution of this character, doing charitable work of great
benefit to the public, and depending upon gifts, donations, legacies, and
bequests made by charitable persons for the successful accomplish-
ment of its beneficial purposes, is not to be hampered in the acquisition
of property and funds for those wishing to contribute and assist in the
charitable work by any doubt that might arise in the minds of such
intending donors as to whether the funds supplied by them will be
applied to the purposes for which they intended to devote them, or
diverted to the entirely different purpose of satisfying judgments recov-
ered against the donee because of the negligent acts of those employed
to carry the beneficial purpose into execution."
By and large, this is the reason for the adoption of the Trust Fund
Doctrine which makes the charitable institution immune of liability for
the negligence of its servants in tort cases. Since the decision of Parks
2 Charities, 14 C. J. S. 75.
3 C. & F. 507 (1846).
4 281 Ill 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556 (1918).
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v. Northwestern University, supra, this doctrine has found expression
in many jurisdictions in the United States.
Let us first make some general observations in regard to the ac-
ceptance of the Trust Fund Doctrine since Parks v. Northwestern Uni-
versity, supra, in this country. Some of the cases absolutely deny the
liability of a charitable institution, in any event, to pay damages for
injuries arising from the negligence or other tort of its servants and
agents. In these cases the Trust Fund Doctrine is stretched to the limit
on the theory that all the property and other holdings of a charitable
institution are potentially a part of the so-called Trust Fund and any
judgment against the charity would in some wise affect this fund.5
However, one finds other cases which merely limit the liability of an
eleemosynary organization, and still this is done by the application of
the Trust Fund theory of immunity. For example, it was held in the
Colorado case of St. Mary's Academy of Sisters of Loretto of the City
of Denver v. Solomon 6:
"The trust fund rule does not preclude the recovery of a judgment
against a charitable institution based on the-tort of its agents or servants
but prohibits the execution of judgment when the trust fund might be
depleted."
This same rule has been followed in Brown v. St. Lukes Hospital Asso-
ciation.7
Thus, one can appreciate that there have been strict and liberal in-
terpretations to the Trust Fund. Now, let us turn to some of the court's
reasoning in its more strict application of the Trust Fund Doctrine. In
the case of Roosen v. Peter Brent Brigham Hospital,7 " the court
sees no distinction between the liability of the servants of an inferior
nature for negligence and the liability of managers and trustees for
the same wrong. To both cases the Trust Fund Doctrine finds applica-
tion.
The Pennsylvania court found that the charitable institution is not
liable for "pay patients" any more than it is liable for non-pay-patients.
It is held that the money which these parties pay is made a part of the
charitable fund and thus to allow recovery from this fund would be to
destroy the whole theory behind the Trust Fund.8
5 Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 336, 141 N. E. 113 (1923);
Roosen v. Peter Brent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392, 14 A. L. R.
563 (1920); Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E.
649 (1916).
6 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22 (1925).
7 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740 (1926).
7a Supra, note 5.
8 Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087, 136 Am. St. Rep.
879 (1910).
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The case of Adams v. University Hospital " goes even a step further
when it said:
"It is manifest that, if we uphold a rule which would make an in-
stitution of charity liable to a patient who has been injured by an in-
competent servant, negligently selected, we destroy the principle we
have endeavored to make plain, that charitable trust funds cannot be
diverted from the purposes of the donor."
The St. Louis Court of Appeals in Whittaker v. St. Lukes Hospital,10
applies the same rules as were developed in Adams v. University Hos-
pital, supra, to cases involving the injury of a servant while at work.
Also in Eads v. Young Womens Christian Association,1 the same
doctrine was developed by the Missouri Court, the court saying:
"Charitable organizations are exempt from liability for negligent in-jury because their funds, being held in trust for charitable purposes may
not be diverted."
However, many of the courts have not so readily accepted the Trust
Fund Doctrine. In Glavin v. Rhode Island,12 the charitable institu-
tion was held liable for negligence in its tort cases.
- Other states have refused to adopt the non-liability of an eleemosy-
nary institution, in Minnesota Geiger v. Simpson Methodist Episcopal
Church 13; in Oklahoma in City of Shawnee v. Raush 14; in Alabama
in Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association.15 Thesegive us the majority
of cases which hold the charitable institution liable. Many of these
courts held charitable institutions liable because of certain claimed
weaknesses of the Trust Fund Doctrine. For some specific criticisms of
the Doctrine where the courts have refused to follow it are seen in the
Minnesota case of Geiger v. Simpson Methodist Episcopal Church,
supra, where it is declared:
"Charitable institutions to be liable for torts in the same manner as
other corporations and individuals, it was said that the trust fund
theory has been so weakened and limited by the decisions that it is
not likely to hereafter have practical application or importance."
Also, in the case of Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association 16 the
opinion stated:
"In opposition to this doctrine it has been pointed out that the
same principle, logically extended would exempt such bodies from lia-
9 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453, 456 (1907).
10 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189 (1909).
11 39 S. W. 2d 701 (Mo., 1930).
12 112 R. 1. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 678 (1879).
13 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463, 62 A. L. R. 716 (1928).
14 101 Okla. 60, 223 P. 354.
15 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 13 L. R. A. 1915D (1915).
16 Ibid.
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bility for any tort of a servant, whereas, at'least in some jurisdictions,
there are various torts for which all employers are held responsible,
even though they are engaged in public charity."
The latest case in point is Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland.1 7
Thus, we have reviewed both sides of the Trust Fund Doctrine as it
has been limited and expanded in the courts of the United States. The
general observation which we may make from these citations is to the
effect that the courts of this country have adopted the Trust Fund
Theory either entirely or in some limited scope.
Indemnifying Insurance is one of the most important limitations
on the Trust Fund Theory. Many courts have construed it so as to
make the eleemosynary institutions liable for the torts committed by
their agents or servants. In the Kentucky case of Williams Adminis-
tratrix v. Church Home for Fenales and Infirmary for Sick,18 the
court adopted the rule that the mere taking out of indemnifying insur-
ance would not make the eleemosynary institution more liable than it
previously was. In adopting this rule the Kentucky court, supra, re-
ferred to the opinion presented in Levy v. Superior Court," which
observed:
"If a liability may be created or an exemption waived by the acts
of the trustee of a charity in procuring and accepting the promise of a
third person to make good the losses following such liability or waiver,
and the trustee thus allowed to accomplish indirectly that which is not
permitted to be done directly, the protection afforded by the rule stated
would be destroyed. No authorities holding in accordance with the ar-
gument of counsel in this behalf have been called to our attention; and
it is our opinion that the theory that a charity, not otherwise subject
to liability, may become liable by reason of the procurement by those
administering it of indemnity insurance cannot be supported in prin-
ciple."
In an early Washington case, Susman v. Young Mens Christian As-
sociation of Seattle,20 the court remarked on indemnifying insurance
as a means of making the charitable organizations not liable to the
effect that:
"The taking of indemnifying insurance was but the exercise of
business prudence. At any rate it could create no liability where none
before existed, however much it might weigh as evidence of the con-
struction the corporation placed upon its limitations and powers."
In Massachusetts in the case of Enman v. Trustees of Boston Uni-
versity 21 it was held in a personal injury action against charitable
17 97 P. 2d 798 (Cal., 1939).
18 3 S. W. 2d 753 (Ky., 1928).
19 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 P. 1100 (1925).
20 101 Wash. 487, 172 P. 554 (1918).
21 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930).
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corporation, a policy of liability insurance was held not admissible to
prove that because of the insurance the defendants were deprived of
exemptions from liability otherwise open to charitable organizations.
The case of Bougon v. Volunteers of America '22 speaks of the ef-
fect of insurance on the liability of a charitable institution when the
court says:
"In at least some of those jurisdictions which apply the trust fund
doctrine to strangers it has been held that even where a charity is pro-
tected by an indemnity insurance policy, no recovery can be had, not-
withstanding the fact that no diversion of the trust funds would result.
In other words, a third person cannot recover from a charitable organ-
ization for the effect of the negligence of its servants, because it would
result in the diversion of trust funds, but, whether there be a diversion
of trust funds or not, there can be no recovery for the same reason."
It is true from many of the latter citations that many courts have
held that indemnifying insurance will not affect the non-liability of
eleemosynary institutions. Nevertheless, many of the latest cases seem
to deviate from this original theory.
In a Mississippi case of Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore,2 3
the court gives the impression that it might allow one injured in a
charitable institution due to the negligence of the servants of the
charity to recover under a general insurance indemnity when the court
said:
"It did not contract to indemnify the patients against the negligence
of the physicians or servants of the hospital, if there was no liability
of the hospital under the law of the land.... If the indemnity had been
taken without a basis for legal liability under the same situation, it
might be permissible to construe it so as to cover some liability in order
to give effect to the contract. In other words, the court would be re-
luctant to hold that a contract of insurance, of which the premium had
been collected, could not be given legal basis to operate."
We see somewhat of a deviation from the old rule that a charitable
institution should be absolutely immune of liability due to the fact
that it is a charity and its trust funds should not be tampered with;
and any act against the limitation of the charities non-liability neces-
sarily tampered with the trust fund. One may observe this deviation
in the case of McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital,2 4 where the court said:
"We think it fairly may be said that the exemption and protection
afforded to a charitable institution is not immunity from suit, not non-
liability for a tort, but that the protection actually given is to the'trust
funds themselves."
This statement seems to imply that it is not wrdng to recover from
an eleemosynary institution for a tort committed by the servant if the
22 151 So. 797 (La., 1934).
23 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930).
24 95 S. W. 2d 917 (Tenn., 1936).
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trust fund is in no way depleted or affected. That is, there is a legal
wrong against a charitable institution for negligence and other torts
of its servants, but the wrong may not be righted since the trust fund
would be harmed. Now, if we assume this reasoning to be true, then
indemnifying insurance will make it possible to collect against the
charity for its torts without affecting the trust funds.
Then, turning to the Colorado case of St. Marys Academy v.
Solomon, supra, we see that the court reasoned:
"that the judgment against a charitable corporation is valid, but that
no property which they hold in charitable trust can be taken under
execution upon it, and if and while they hold no property but in such
trust this judgment can't be collected."
From the statement of this court, one is led to assume that if the
charitable corporation had indemnifying insurance the judgment against
them might be satisfied through this medium, and, in the principal
Colorado case of O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Associa-
tion, April 1940, supra, -the court followed this reasoning by holding
the defendent, charitable institution, liable for its negligent acts of its
servants on the theory that the Trust Fund Doctrine has not been dis-
turbed by this reasoning since the payment of the judgment comes from
the indemnifying insurance.
The latter case is the latest case decided on this point of law. From
this case, one is able to see that the trend in the future points to lia-
bility for charitable institutions when the latter is indemnified by in-
surance. And, from the point of view of justice, it seems that this is
the most satisfactory and equitable solution to the problem. My rea-
sons for this view is bound in the reasoning that when a charitable in-
stitution takes out insurance, it does so for the benefit of those who
are injured by the negligence or other tort of its servants. Then, why
shouldn't the one so indemnified be allowed to collect on the insurance
policy? If one holds otherwise, the insurance company is the only one
benefiting, and both the insured and the injured parties stand to lose.
It seems perfectly fair and logical, then, to hold a charitable institution
liable for its torts when said institution carries indemnifying insurance
covering the wrong committed, and the judgment collected is solely
through the insurance company and the Trust Fund is not depleted
in any wise.
The trend of cases seems to adopt this view, and the writer submits
that this seems to be the most equitable means of handling the situation
since all wrongs are satisfied and no one is injured; the injured party
may recover, the trust fund theory or the trust fund is not injured or
depleted, and the insurance company is merely paying the claim which
it has insured against.
James H. Neu.
